The main thrust of research in the area of public-policy implementation has been to analyze the problems of implementing public policy. In other words, What accounts for the differential success of public policies in the implementation process? Few researchers have sought to examine the impact of implementation problem definition on the analytic frameworks they use. This is important because how one defines the implementation problem shapes both the analysis of key issues in the process and the recommendations that result from the analysis. If the implementation problem is incorrectly defined in a model, the results J-PART 10(2000):3:551-571 of any analysis that uses this model will be flawed. Thus it is
important to step back and examine the adequacy of different definitions of the implementation problem. Doing so will result in implementation research that provides a better understanding of the process.
The implementation problem can be defined in two basic ways (Stoker 1983) . The first and more traditional focus of implementation studies is on problems of organizational management. This approach concentrates on the ability of single authority structures (i.e., an organization or central authority) to effectively manage the implementation process. According to this view, policy managers see goal specification and control of subordinates as the essential implementation problems (p. 6). Factors that inhibit effective management include such things as " (1) technical incompetence . . . of bureaucratic agents, (2) the enforcement of illegitimate political preferences by the agents, (3) the structural characteristics of the implementing institutions, and (4) communication failures between policy makers and subordinates" (p. 10). Policy makers and managers are seen to have legitimate control of the process. The politics of implementation is viewed in terms of the administrative process, not as a basic contradictions of values. Therefore, any conflict that might arise in the implementation process is not viewed as legitimate. The solutions that result from this definition of the implementation problem focus on creating more effective ways to manage communications, resources, and bureaucratic dispositions. Effective management is the key to solving the implementation problem.
The implementation problem also can be conceived of as a conflict of interest in the process. Given the existence of this conflict, such a conception of the problem would focus on how to elicit cooperation from those who participate in the implementation process. Thus " [m] anagement of potential [interorganizational] conflict would be an essential part of the policy making process ..." (Stoker 1983, 7) . Power in the implementation process is seen as disbursed so that participants must bargain in order to gain a capacity to act. This makes the strategic contexts in which actors participate an important element of the implementation process. Since power is shared, this perspective suggests that conflict of interest in the process is a legitimate struggle over basic values (Stoker 1989) . Thus it is conflict over values that more often than not hinders the implementation of a policy. Problems of generating cooperation in situations of conflict of interest are likely to stymie implementation before issues of organizational management become an obstacle. The solution offered by this perspective is to build institutions or mechanisms that create a cooperative context for those who participate in the implementation process.
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Organizational Management versus Cooperation ' The third generation of implementation literature refers to the development of research in this area. The first generation was based on case study methodology. The second generation developed analytic frameworks and tested them. The third generation has revised and synthesized these prior analytic frameworks.
The central question to be addressed in this analysis is, Which definition of the implementation problem provides a better understanding of the process? The answer has important implications for the future of implementation research. If implementation research is to be useful, it must focus on the problems that arise in the implementation process. To deal with these issues, the analysis is structured as follows. First, I will select appropriate analytic frameworks of the implementation process and briefly outline the implementation models. I will evaluate the models on a set of criteria that consists of important issues that must be addressed. These criteria include the following: top-down versus bottom-up debate; role of communication; conflict/cooperation; and networked implementation settings. I will discuss the findings of this evaluation and conclude with a focus on the directions and implications the findings have for future implementation research.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS
In examining the effects of using different conceptions of the implementation problem, it is important to select the appropriate models to analyze. The first criterion is to choose one model that uses each of the different conceptions of the implementation problem. A second important criterion is to select implementation models from the "third generation" of the implementation literature.
1 This is important because these models have attempted to resolve the issue of "wherner attention should be focused on fidelity to the designer's plan or on the general consequences of the implementation actions when determining success" (Matland 1995, 154) . This allows for a clearer focus on other important implementation issues. It is important to select models that offer a more developed or unique approach to the analysis of the implementation process. By doing this, these implementation models offer a real contribution to the study of implementation.
The communication model of intergovernmental policy implementation offered by Goggin et al. (1990) is one of the implementation frameworks that will be examined in this study. The communications model (CM) is based on the assumption that organizational management issues are the primary implementation problem. The CM is also one of the most theoretically developed third generation models. Underlying its development is me conceptual and methodological critique of previous implementation research (Bowman and Lester 1993; Lester et al. 1987) . Thus the CM is not only an analytical framework, it is also the embodiment of a larger research program meant to guide future implementation research.
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The implementation regime framework (Stoker 1991 and Stone 1990; Stone and Sanders 1987) is the other implementation framework that will be examined in this study. The implementation regime framework (IRF) is based on the conflict of interest conception of the implementation problem. It was developed primarily by Stoker in response to his critiques of the dominant organizational management perspective in implementation studies. This is the only third generation implementation framework that explicitly states that the problems of eliciting cooperation in conflictual settings is central to more effective implementation. Thus it provides the necessary contrast to the organizational management conception offered by Goggin et al. (1990) .
The Communication Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation
Underlying the communication model of intergovernmental policy implementation (CM) is the conceptualization of intergovernmental policy making as an "implementation subsystem full of messages, messengers, channels, and targets operating within a broader communications system" (Goggin et al. 1990, 33 ). Essentially, state-level implementers form the nexus for communications coming from both national and local level senders. The interpretation of these messages is a function of the contextually different settings in which it is received.
The CM conceptualizes state implementation as its dependent variable. State-level implementation has three elements. The first is a process or series of state decisions and actions that lead to the timely and satisfactory performance of putting a national mandate into effect. The CM also includes outputs (program goals achieved) and outcomes (substantive results) as parts of implementation. Goggin et al. (1990, 48) use implementation style, which is "a function of behavior having to do with both the timing of implementation and the nature and direction of change in the program objectives and the tools and instruments adopted to achieve them." Periodic assessments of implementation style are to be conducted in order to avoid a one-time determination of policy success or failure.
State-level implementation is seen as the product of inducements and constraints from national, state, and local levels. Federal policy "consists of information, expectations, exhortations, often resources and sanctions intended to influence the actions of these others" (Goggin et al. 1990, 75) . Federal policy is seen as a political message. Factors that account for the 554/J-PART, July 2000
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varying responses among states include content, the form of the message itself, and the reputation of the communicators. The CM also stresses the importance of the organization at the state and local levels. This is the component that examines the interaction of organized interests, elected and appointed officials, and the focal state agency that "generatefs] the climate of receptivity the federal directive encounters" by sending messages to the state implementers (Bowman and Lester 1993) .
These national, state, and local inducements and constraints impact a state's decisional outcome, as well as its capacity to act. Whether or not state decision makers decide to act is influenced by their perception of the messages and information flowing from the national, state, and local levels. The decision to implement is a necessary precursor to the next part of the process: the state's capacity to act. A state's capacity to act also influences a state's ability to act in compliance with a national mandate. It is made up of two factors. One of tiiese factors is organizational capacity. The structure, personnel, and financial resources of its implementing agency or agencies determine a state's organizational capacity. Ecological capacity is the other factor. This "pertains to the contextual environment in which state government operates" (Goggin et al. 1990, 38) . A state's economic, political, and situational capacity are all part of its larger ecological capacity.
In addition to these conceptual issues, Goggin et al. also address methodological concerns. They believe implementation should be studied in a genuinely comparative manner. Thus implementation should be examined in a combination of macroand microenvironments (i.e., a combination of large and small n studies) and across policy areas. They also see the need to generate measurable variables of the implementation phenomena. This will help to identify variables that are crucial to die implementation process (Lester et al. 1987) . The ability to measure these variables across time is also important. However, this raises additional measurement concerns. One must develop reliable and valid data for diachronic studies. While this may be a daunting task, Goggin et al. believe that is necessary to address both conceptual and methodological issues to attain theoretical cumulation and clarity in implementation research.
Implementation Regime Framework
According to Stoker (1991, 55) , a regime is "a political arrangement that institutionalizes values important in public decision making; but a regime is also a set of organizational arrangements that helps define and support the political in it."
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At the organizational level, a regime consists of a set of rules, norms, and procedures that guides the interaction of participants in collective decision making. These political arrangements or regimes may be able to alter such things as the costs of transactions, availability of information, or level of uncertainty (Axelrod and Keohane 1985) . It can promote cooperation by providing a setting in which relationships are more predictable.
This concept can be applied to implementation in the context of federal governance. An implementation regime "can be an arrangement among implementation participants that identifies the values to be served during the implementation process and provides an organizational framework to promote those values" (Stoker 1991, 55) . According to Stone (1980, 269) , regimes are shaped by "potentially conflicting principles." With respect to the federal system, the imperatives that must be reconciled are the desires for central leadership and diffuse implementation authority. In the federal context, national policies must contend with the forces of federalism and liberalism, which diffuse authority (Stoker 1991, 10-13) . It is this diffusion that requires the participation of implementers who may represent interests or perspectives that are divergent from the national policy. The use of reluctant partners in the implementation process requires national policy formulators to seek cooperation and coordination and allows for strategic behavior on the part of the subnational intermediaries (Stoker 1991, 53) .
The primary task of implementation is to create a context that will induce the participants to cooperate in the presence of conflict of interest. Thus to determine the success of the implementation process, one must examine the strategic and institutional contexts that make up a particular regime. The strategic context refers to the degree of conflict that exists between participants in the implementation process. Institutional context alludes to mechanisms or arrangements in the process that promote cooperation. The exact nature of the influence of these on the inclination of participants to cooperate in the implementation process requires further elaboration. Before moving into an indepth discussion of the strategic context envisioned by the regime framework, it is important to examine the relationship between conflict and cooperation.
The source of conflict in the implementation process arises from the nature of the process itself as specification and reassessment occur (Stone 1980) . Stoker (1991) suggests that this conflict takes place in the larger context of federalism and liberalism as reluctant partners represent different values and
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Organizational Management versus Cooperation interests. According to Keohane (1984) , cooperation only can occur in the aftermath of conflict between implementation participants. Specifically, he describes cooperation as "negotiation to bring separate entities into conformity with one another; this highly political activity can occur only when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated behavior of others" (Keohane quoted in Stoker 1991, 61) .
The strategic context envisioned by the regime framework involves situations in which the motives of the participants are mixed. In other words, incentives exist for both cooperation and defection. Stoker (1991) conceives of the relationship among implementation participants as one that takes place in these mixed motive games.
2 Axelrod (1970) suggests an inverse relationship between the level of conflict and the incentives that implementation participants have to cooperate in mixed motive games. This points to the idea that cooperation can be induced by implementation participants' manipulation of the strategic context. Given this mixed motive context, it is important to investigate the institutional context-specifically, the presence or absence of mechanisms and arrangements that promote cooperation. The regime framework posits that over time the implementation process will move from a situation where the cost of defection is low to one where it is high and cooperation is encouraged. The establishment of long-term relationships relies on such things as the expectation of future interactions and a commitment of resources to promote trust and reciprocity (Stoker 1989, 41-43) . Other mechanisms and arrangements also work to promote cooperation in the short term: side payments, issue linkages, and standards of conduct, for example, can be used to alter the perceived payoff structure among implementation participants. Both long-and short-term mechanisms and arrangements are an important focus for implementation analysts.
The regime framework also recognizes that these efforts to induce cooperation do not take place in a political vacuum. Stoker (1991) suggests that there are political consequences to the formation of implementation regimes as they seek to reconcile the competing federal imperatives of centralized leadership and diffused implementation authority and ability. In this context, national policy formulators must seek partnerships with those who control "enough resources to have leverage in an otherwise " _, ^ gridlocked world" (Stone 1989, 230) . As a result, those who 'In order for games to be considered
mixed, two conditions must be met: first, c 011 * 01 P°h c y resources are in a position to implicitly make some benefit to cooperation and second, a political judgments that shape the design of regimes as well as need for cooperation (Stoker 1991,61) . the evolution of policy within them. Regime development is very much a political process and has political consequences for the implementation process.
A COMPARISON OF THE APPROACHES
Both the communications model (CM) and the implementation regime framework (IRF) explain the implementation process. However, by focusing on different definitions of the implementation problem, these models offer a different analysis of the implementation process. This basic difference invites a comparison across a number of criteria that will be used to evaluate the utility of each model. These criteria include the following: (1) the treatment of the top-down and bottom-up approaches; (2) the role of communication in the process; (3) the treatment of the level of conflict/cooperation in the process; and (4) the applicability to networks.
Treatment of the Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches
The major point of contention between top-down and bottom-up theorists is how to evaluate the success of implementation. The top-down perspective focuses on factors that can be manipulated by policy designers at the central level (Matland 1995, 146) . Measures of success are tied directly to the statute. Bottom-up theorists emphasize the importance of target groups and service deliverers in policy making (p. 146). They favor a much broader evaluation of success based on what can be seen as positive outcomes. Stoker (1989, 29) suggests that both these competing perspectives are important to implementation in a federal system. Failure to reconcile the two perspectives will only hinder the development of implementation research. This has led to third generation efforts to synthesize these perspectives or offer wholly different directions for future implementation research.
The CM suggests that the top-down and bottom-up perspectives are not necessarily wrong in how they view the implementation process, but when they are used separately they each provide an incomplete analysis. Accordingly, it synthesizes these approaches into a more comprehensive framework using communications theory. State-level implementers receive policy messages from the national, state, and local levels. National-level inducements and constraints are used to incorporate top-down influences. The bottom-up influence of state and local actors is represented in the model by state and local inducements and constraints. Thus state implementers are at the nexus of communication in the federal system.
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While the Goggin et al. approach offers a synthesis of these perspectives, it places the ultimate authority of the implementation process in the hands of the federal policy leadership. According to Lester and Goggin (1998, 23) , "[TJn order to resolve the implementation paradox . . . ways must be found to enhance the control over the implementation process that national formulators enjoy." Change in the implementation process does not arise out of the process itself, but must be sent as a policy message from state implementers to policy designers at the federal level. It is here that the problems of implementation will be handled by "better 'policy design' or by 'framing smarter statutes'" (Lester and Goggin 1998, 23) . These structured solutions will then be sent back to state implementers via the policy message and will provide an organizational framework to serve and promote the proper values in the implementation process. Thus the Goggin et al. approach, which reflects the organizational management view of the implementation problem, offers a predominantly top-down model of the implementation process.
The implementation regime framework (IRF) offers a very different conception of how to define the problem of implementation in a context of diffuse authority. In doing so, it draws on the lessons provided by the view of the implementation problem provided by the top-down and bottom-up perspectives. The top-down perspective points to the need for instrumentally effective implementation of policy but is overreliant on coercive control to attempt to bring about cooperation. The bottom-up perspective provides the view that national government control is diffuse as strategic interests have a right to bargain in the implementation process. However, this approach does not take into account conflict, and thus it severely restricts the kinds of policy that government can pursue. These approaches both are based on the concept that power is created at the federal level only to be diluted by the reluctant partners.
The IRF builds on these lessons and suggest a new conception of the implementation problem. In defining implementation as the problem of governance, the regime framework suggests a different conception of power as its foundation. It suggests that power is created in the implementation process in order to produce the "capacity to act" (Stone 1989) . Furthermore, the implementation regime framework places this conflict in a larger social and political context. From this vantage point, government is not necessarily disabled by diffuse authority and can achieve instrumentally rational policy, but it must induce cooperation to do so.
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Role of Communication
The importance of communication in the implementation process is not a point of contention among those who study implementation. Communication is considered to be necessary if one wants to successfully implement a policy. However, important differences arise when the exact function of communication is discussed. One way to view communication is to emphasize the need for clarity and consistency in form and content in order to increase the likelihood of compliance and execution of a particular policy. Clear communication also can lead to better-designed policy. Of course, if communication among parties is lacking in these respects, the resulting distortions could very well lead to implementation failure. Another way to view communication is to stress its importance with respect to conflict resolution. It is important in building trust, increasing cooperation, and increasing the right kind of involvement among actors in the implementation process (Scheberle 1997, ch. 6) . The two models examined in this article have opposing views about the function communication serves. These opposing views reflect how each of these models perceives the nature of the implementation problem.
The CM uses communication theory as the basis for interaction among its participants in the implementation process. It conceptualizes intergovernmental policy making as the interaction of message senders and receivers in a broader communication system. State implementers are placed at the hub of this communication system. They receive messages from both the national and the state and local levels. The variability of state-level implementation is a function of how the state implementers interpret the messages they receive, given their different contextual settings.
In addition to this, the CM also conceives of a feedback mechanism from the implementers and those who are targets of a particular policy. In this instance, the federal-level principals are the receivers of messages from the agents at the state and local levels. The purpose of this feedback is to improve policy design with the implication of improving future implementation of a policy. Goggin et al. (1990, 161) suggest one of the most effective means of communicating information to the federal principals is through formal policy analysis and demonstration projects. All in all, the CM conceives of communication as something to be used in order to increase the effectiveness of policy implementation through improved policy design.
Even though Goggin et al. use communication as the basis for their model, they offer a limited view of the uses of communication. Ostrom (1998, 13) provides a fuller picture of the potential of communication in the implementation process: "With a repeated chance to see and talk with others, a participant can assess whether s/he trusts others sufficiently to try to reach a simple contingent agreement regarding the level of joint effort and its allocation." Thus, communication is important in the development of trust, reputations, and norms of reciprocity among participants in the implementation process. Furthermore, Ostrom (pp. 13, 15) links these elements of the "core relationship" to levels of cooperation. The approach offered by Goggin et al., grounded in organizational management, fails to acknowledge any of tihese potentialities. It is simply too confining in its conception of the role of communication.
The IRF conceives of communication in its role as a resolver of conflict. The IRF suggests that over time, regimes tend to move along a predictable dynamic toward cooperation. Specific factors such as reliability of information and quick feedback can help to build mutual trust and cooperation among regime participants. These factors can be especially important in the early stages of relationships in which parties expect to have future interactions. Regime arrangements that have a history of cooperation and the expectation of future interaction can build stronger relationships by using such strategies as reciprocity to build trust and reputation as well as to reduce the costs of transactions and the level of uncertainty. Many mechanisms that promote cooperation in the IRF are reliant on good communication between participants in the implementation process. The role of communication is more than a means of communicating the will of policy formulators. Face-to-face communication is a means of attaining cooperation in an implementation process full of potential conflicts of interest. It offers participants in the process the opportunity to combine resources in order to accomplish things they could not accomplish separately. Stoker's IRF incorporates Ostrom's more comprehensive view about the role of communication in the implementation process.
The Treatment of Conflict and Cooperation
Much like the issue of communication, there is no disagreement that conflict exists in the implementation process among the various actors. Scheberle (1997) states that conflict in the implementation relationship is much more prevalent than cooperation and that it is not guaranteed in the implementation relationship. Furthermore, Scheberle (p. 18) enumerates the benefits of cooperative relationships or "pulling together." The differences on this issue arise concerning the legitimacy of conflict. One view suggests that conflict is dysfunctional and needs to be controlled. This view acknowledges the presence of a conflict of interests 561/ J-PART, July 2000
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among different actors at different levels (federal and state) of government. According to Stoker (1983, 6 ), this conception of conflict "creates a view of the implementation process that implies that goal specification and control of subordinates are the essential implementation problems." Conflict is linked with policy failure. Another perspective sees conflict as a legitimate part of the implementation process. Conflict in the implementation process is simply a reflection of the conflict in larger society. Hence the implementation problem is one of resolving conflicts or achieving cooperation.
The CM recognizes that conflict in the implementation process is common and is a result of the differences between national and subnational priorities. It also acknowledges the need for cooperation and coordination in response to the complexity of joint action present in the process. However, this is the extent of its treatment of cooperation and conflict. By not placing conflict in the larger social and political context, it is seen to arise solely in the administrative process and not larger society. This makes it an organizational management problem. The CM offers communication as one remedy for conflict. Clear and consistent messages from the principal to the agent informed by feedback can lead to a policy design to address issues of conflict in the implementation context. This perspective sees the policy development process as resolving, not creating, conflict in the implementation stage.
The view of conflict presented by the CM is limited. It does not link conflict in the implementation process to conflicts over larger social values. As I have mentioned, conflict is something that can be designed out of the process by policy formulators and designers. Cooperation is passed from the top down. It is not negotiated among those participating in the implementation process itself. Any type of politics or political bargaining that might take place among those participating in the implementation process would be deemed illegitimate. This view tends to delink implementation not only from the rest of the policy process but from larger society as well. Thus conflict is viewed only in terms of the administrative process.
The ERF conceives of the implementation problem as conflict resolution or the ability to create a cooperative context. The relationship between conflict and cooperation is important to a discussion of the ERF. According to Stoker, the extent of conflict and the likelihood of cooperation are conceptually separate. "Cooperation is more properly seen as a response to conflict, not the absence of it" (1989, 50 ; also see Axelrod 1984) . The relationship of conflict and cooperation are clear only in the rare
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3 Otherwise, this relationship is ambiguous at best.
Stoker (1991, 50) suggests that in mixed motive situations "the likelihood of cooperation can be altered even when the amount of conflict is held constant." As a result of this, creating a context for cooperation in the midst of conflicts of interest is seen as the major task of implementation. It is important in helping to generate the capacity to act and accomplish goals. The presence or absence of mechanisms or arrangements that promote cooperation is the explanation IRF provides for the nonrealization of policy. It, along with conflict, forms the basis for the strategic and institutional contexts so important to the IRF. Efforts to induce cooperation are in part responsible for creation and development of implementation regimes, which can have their own effect on implementation.
Furthermore, the ERF sees conflict in the implementation process as legitimate. Stone (1980) suggests that it is inherent in the process as specification and reassessment of goals and priorities occur. Stoker (1991) also sees conflict of interest as legitimate due to the inclusion of reluctant partners in the implementation process. Their presence guarantees them the right to represent their interests, which may be at odds with the national policy. As this diffuse authority is created by the larger forces of federalism and liberalism, conflict is placed within a larger social and political context (Stoker 1983). 4 This larger social conflict manifests itself in the implementation process via the policy development process. Stoker sees the policy development process as important in shaping the conflict 3 Stoker (1991, 50) grants-in-aid to see the influence of policy development on the instead, a problem in the implementation implementation process. Ingram (1977) examines the role of phase is one of the entire policy-making federal grants-in-aid in the implementation process and argues system. Sabaner and Jenkins-Smith devel-±at 0Qe should view me relationship between the federal governoped the advocacy coalition framework to ... ,. . , • • , .
• • u examine the function of conflict in ment and lts intermediaries as bargaining rather than principal/ generating policy learning and change in agent. Thus "[r]ather than gaining compliance, the funds seem the entire policy process.
only to provide the opportunity to engage in strategic interaction and bargaining. ..." (Stoker 1989, 54) . The very form of the grant-in-aid shapes this strategic interaction. The more restrictive and demanding nature of categorical grants tends to give the upper hand to federal agencies and actors. The use of categorical grants is driven in part by federal distrust of subordinate levels of government (ACIR 1977) . On the other hand, block grants give state and local actors more freedom to pursue their own objectives and goals. The use of these different forms of grants-in-aid shapes the strategic interaction between implementation participants and the likelihood that federal goals will be achieved (Stoker 1983, 55 ).
Applicability to Networked Settings
O'Toole (1997a) and Milward (1996) make the argument that pubic administration increasingly is taking place in networked settings. O'Toole offers evidence that networks increasingly are becoming common. Federal activities increasingly are becoming interagency; they are also involving not-for-profit organizations and for-profit firms. O'Toole (pp. 46-47) takes the argument further by suggesting that complex networks increasingly are becoming important due to such things as "wicked problems," contexts of dispersed power, layers of mandates, and crossover sanctions. Milward (1996) sees that the delivery of government services increasingly is taking place in networked settings or a "hollow state."
3 The consequences of these arguments suggest that those who research implementation policy need to be able to explain how networks effect the implementation process.
While each of the models is applicable to networked settings, they approach it with a different emphasis. The CM takes an instrumental view of networked settings in the implementation process. According to Kickert et al. (1997) , the instrumental view acknowledges the presence of networks but retains "me fundamental assumption of one 'steering' actor who exercises goal-oriented influence on other actors-target groups" (p. 183).
6
In the case of the CM, the participants steering the process are national policy formulators. Their targets are state implementers. The problem of implementing policy is one of properly adjusting the policy through the policy design process based on feedback from the state and local agents. The problems of uncertainty and lack of institutionalization would be resolved at the federal level through policy development, not through the actual implementers of the policy. The goals of the national policy formulators and designers are to be served in the implementation process. According to Lester and Goggin (1998, 23) , the key to resolving
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While the CM focuses on the goal attainment of national policy fonnulators in the implementation process, it fails to address the limits "set on goal-oriented operations in networks" (Kickert et al. 1997, 184) . It does not take into account "the interests, objectives, perceptions, and strategies of other actors and the institutional context in which they function" (Kickert et al. 1997, 184) . The failure of the CM to adequately deal with issues of interaction and the roles of institutions limits its applicability to networked settings.
The CM also fails to address important issues of interaction. It has a restricted view of the politics of the implementation process. The interactions of those who implement policy is considered to be a problem that must be dealt with. The goals and strategies of state implementers are to be subordinated to those of the national policy fonnulators. Important decisions about implementation are communicated through policy messages from state implementers to policy designers. Implementation issues are dealt with at the policy development stage. Thus there is not much room, if any, for legitimate interaction in the implementation process according to the CM.
The CM lacks any discussion of the relationship between actors in the implementation process and institutions. Due to this lack of discussion about the roles of institutions in the implementation process, the CM portrays the process as somehow separate from the rest of society. It is viewed out of context. This point can be illustrated by the CM's treatment of the issue of conflict of interest. Conflict is not considered to be a contest over competing social values (i.e., the value of central leadership versus diffuse authority) but as something produced in the administrative process. Thus conflict that arises out of the implementation process is treated as an organizational problem to be resolved by the design of better statutes.
The IRF approaches the concept of networks involved in implementation differently than does the CM. First of ail, the IRF operates on the assumption of dispersed authority. This is exactly why regimes are formed in the first place. Government does not possess the capacity by itself to execute its policy initiatives. Stoker models the strategic context of the regime, which could be conceived of as a network, using game theory. Not only can intergovernmental behavior be analyzed by using this approach, but actors in the private sector can be as well (Stoker 1991; Stone 1989: Stone and Sanders 1987) . O'Toole (1997b) sees implementation in networks as a problem of cooperation. Problems of uncertainty and a lack of institutionalization at the formative stages of implementation create challenges for those who would manage or facilitate the implementation of innovative policy. The ERF also conceives of the implementation problem as inducing cooperation in situations where conflict is prevalent. According to Stoker (1991, 54) , "Cooperation is more likely when participants are engaged in an ongoing relationship that creates a record of constructive interaction and expectations for the future." When these conditions are absent, implementation regime participants may use such mechanisms as side payments, issue linkage, and norms of reciprocity in order to build trust and cooperation.
Klijn (1996, 104) argues that managing or steering networks is not the sole province of government. Instead, it takes place in a "shared power world," giving rise to what Klijn sees as a network perspective on management. The IRF embodies many of the same characteristics of this network management perspective. The IRF views policy implementation as a complex interaction between different actors where there is no clear indisputable authority (Klijn 1996, 106) . The role of a manager or facilitator is to construct a context for successful interaction. The IRF suggests the need to create a context of cooperation in order to facilitate this interaction. With respect to the activities of a manager or facilitator, the ERF suggests the necessity of coalition building through communication. Many of the recommendations flowing from the IRF fit this network management perspective.
To deal properly with networked settings, a framework must go beyond simply looking at the interaction among network participants; it must also acknowledge the important role of institutions in the implementation process. Hjern and Porter's (1981) idea of implementation structures captures this linkage of actor and institution in the process. According to Hjern and Porter, the implementation of programs may not include whole organizations, but rather the interactions of program-relevant individuals in these organizations (see also O'Toole, Hanf, and Hupe 1997) . These individuals do not operate totally independent of their organizations; they carry the organization they are representing as a "frame of reference" (Kaufman 1986 ). The views of individual actors and their organizational frames of reference shape their interaction in the implementation network or structure.
Stoker's discussion of the institutional context of implementation regimes acknowledges the significance of placing implementation participants in their proper institutional settings. Specifically, Stoker's IRF stresses the important "role of rules
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and organizational frameworks, which set the stage for strategy formulation and interactions" (Kickert et al. 1997, 185 ). Stoker's combination of interactional and institutional contexts also acknowledges the importance of repeated games between actors in forming the rules and norms of the implementation regime (Klijn and Teisman 1997, 104 ). Stoker's ERF places the strategic interaction of regime/network participants in their larger structural and cultural contexts.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to address the question, Which implementation problem definition provides a better understanding of the implementation process? The ERF focuses on die problem of achieving cooperation in the midst of a conflict of interest among implementation participants. The CM focuses on die problem of implementation as involving issues of organizational management. Bureaucratic incompetence, lack of resources, and unclear messages block execution of policy and compliance with directives. The comparison of models that use different conceptions of the implementation problem across important criteria has led to several important implications for future implementation research.
One important implication drawn from this comparison is the inadequacy of defining die problem of implementation as one tiiat is primarily related to organizational management. The CM presents an overly restricted view of the implementation process and adopts an overly centralized view of the process. Legitimate authority is placed in the hands of national policy formulators and no one else. Therefore, adaptations on die part of other actors are seen as subverting die goals of the process. The roles of communication and conflict are also viewed too narrowly. Communication is used to emphasize and clarify die goals of diese topdown authorities. This neglects die larger role Ostrom (1998) suggests it has in generating trust and cooperation. Conflict among participants is seen as a problem to be solved and not as a legitimate part of die process. Networked implementation settings are approached from an instrumental viewpoint. By taking this view, die CM neglects a discussion of die strategic and institutional contexts of die implementation process, in essence incorrecdy isolating die process from its larger social and political context. Analysis diat results from the use of tiiis model will suffer from construing the process too narrowly.
Stoker's ERF provides a much better framework from which to analyze die implementation process. It is guided by its underlying assumption that the primary implementation problem is to 567/ J-PART, July 2000
Organizational Management versus Cooperation achieve cooperation in a context of conflicting interests. The IRF correctly places implementation in its larger social and political contexts, which can be seen in its treatment of conflict and networked settings. Conflict is viewed as legitimate among competing social values. Politics within the implementation process is seen as a continuation of conflict from the policy development stage. Thus the ERF links the implementation phase to other stages in the policy process. In addressing networked settings, the IRF examines the importance of the strategic interactions of participants in their larger institutional context. The implementation process is not seen as an isolated process, but in its larger context as a type of social dilemma (Ostrom 1998) . The analysis that results from this model provides a more complete view of what crucial variables are at work in the process.
Beyond defining the implementation problem correctly, there is the issue of how to pursue implementation research. While the model, CM, presented by Goggin et al. (1990) is flawed in its primary focus on organizational management issues, their larger perspective on implementation research does have some merit. In their critique of the implementation literature, Goggin and colleagues focus on several important conceptual and methodological issues in building a larger research program for implementation issues. One of these is to extend the analysis of implementation beyond a simple success/failure dichotomy. By viewing implementation in terms of outputs, processes, and outcomes, analysts can provide a more detailed picture of the actual process. Another important element of Goggin et al.'s suggested research program is a genuinely comparative design that incorporates both large and small n studies. This combination could capture any large or systemic pattern, as well as important contextual variations, of influential factors in the implementation process. Finally, they emphasize the need to focus implementation analysis over time. While it may be difficult to find or develop the necessary data, longitudinal analysis is necessary to capture the dynamic nature of interaction in the implementation process. These recommendations provide the conceptual and methodological foundations for any future research effort.
Increasingly, implementation of government policy is taking place in networked settings (Provan and Milward 1995; O'Toole 1997a and 1997b; O'Toole et al. 1997; Klijn 1996) . If future implementation research is to provide useful analysis, it must focus on the interaction of those implementing policy in these networked settings. In turn this analysis needs to be guided by a larger research program centered around a proper definition of the implementation problem, as well as good conceptual and methodological approach. The findings I have demonstrated in 'Scheberie's (1997) focus of analysis is the relations between federal, regional, and state actors who are involved in implementing the same environmental programs.
this article show the importance of defining the primary implementation problem as one of generating cooperation in a potentially conflictual setting. This problem definition can provide the base for directing the conceptual and methodological suggestions made by Goggin et al. (1990) .
Following these directions, implementation research could focus on examining the interaction in implementation structures and working relationships (Hanf and O'Toole 1992; Scheberle 1997) . The concept of implementation structures places the strategic interactions of participants into their larger institutional contexts. The utilizing of implementation structures allows one to focus on different actors involved in different processes at different levels. One could look at the impact of resources, policy characteristics, and information on the level of cooperation over time in a given policy network. Scheberie's focus on working relationships could be expanded, using a state comparative framework to examine which factors inhibit or promote cooperation among federal, regional, and state actors. 7 The focal point of this research is the explanation of variation of levels of cooperation among the states. This larger comparison could be bolstered by case studies that provide a more detailed look at a state's relationship with its federal counterpart. With a focus on the nature of interaction, die implementation structure approach and die concept of working relationships provide useful starting points for implementation research concerned with the problem of cooperation.
The comparison of these two models has illuminated several important points for future implementation research to address. Stoker's ERF shows the benefits of defining the primary problem as one of gaining cooperation among participants. By doing so, it is able to place the strategic interaction of participants in uieir larger social and political contexts. This has the effect of making contextual analysis more important in implementation research. Goggin et al. provide a useful conceptual and mediodological critique of previous research. While their focus on organizational management as the primary problem is flawed, the foundation on which it is laid is not. By suggesting that implementation is not merely a success or failure and by using a genuinely comparative design and longitudinal analysis, Goggin et al. furnish the foundations upon which future research should be based. A synthesis of the significant contributions of each of these models provides future researchers with an approach diat will yield meaningful analysis of the implementation process.
